[Book Review of] How to improve the development impact of foreign direct investment: a review. by Nunnenkamp, Peter
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nunnenkamp, Peter
Book Review
[Book Review of] How to improve the development
impact of foreign direct investment: a review
Review of world economis = Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv
Provided in cooperation with:
Institut für Weltwirtschaft (IfW)
Suggested citation: Nunnenkamp, Peter (2004) : [Book Review of] How to improve the
development impact of foreign direct investment: a review, Review of world economis
= Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, ISSN 1610-2878, Vol. 140, Iss. 3, pp. 525-533, http://
hdl.handle.net/10419/3398BOOK REVIEW ESSAY
How to Improve the Developtnental Impact of
Foreign Direct Investtnent: A Review
PeterNunnenkamp
Kiel Institute for World Economics, Kiel
Most economists would probably agree that it is not sufficient for devel-
oping countries to attract more foreign direct investment (FDI). Even for
host countrieswith high attractiveness to FDI, the challenge remains to en-
surethatFDI fosters economicdevelopment, e.g., byinducingtechnological
and managerial spillovers, generating additional employment and income
opportunities, andalleviatingworld-marketintegration. However, the con-
sensus hardlygoes further than this. It continues to be highlycontroversial
what, ifanything, host-countrygovernmentscan andshoulddo to improve
the developmental impact ofFDI in ThirdWorld economies.
Two recent UNCTAD publications on the theme «FDI policies for
development" do not provide ready-made solutions for policymakers in
developing countries. Nevertheless, the detailed assessment ofcontentious
FDI policies offers valuable insights. This refers especially to the World In-
vestment Report 2003 which, in addition to the regular part on recent FDI
trends, focuses onthedevelopmentaldimensionofbi-,pluri-, andmultilat-
eralinvestment agreements (UNCTAD 2003a: Part 2). The reportdiscusses
eight key issues: the definition of investment, national treatment of for-
eign investors, nationalization andexpropriation, dispute settlementmech-
anisms, performance requirements, FDI incentives, technology transfers,
andcompetition policy. As concernsperformance requirements, UNCTAD
(2003a) draws on a concurrentpublication offering detailed evidence from
selectedhostcountries(UNCTAD 2003b). Countrystudiesontheincidence
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and impact ofperformance requirements relate to Chile, India, Malaysia,
and the Republic ofSouth Africa. In addition, the volume summarizes the
experience ofdeveloped countries and provides an overall assessment.
The special attention given to performance requirements may surprise
manyreaders. Whyso muchado eventhoughtheincidence ofperformance
requirements has declined sharply? The TRIMs (Trade-Related Investment
Measures) Agreement under the WTO umbrella prohibits local content
obligations, export restrictions as well as trade-balancing requirements.
Various developing countries have tied their hands further by giving up
performance requirements related to local equity participation, employ-
ment, exports, and technology transfers in the context ofbilateral invest-
menttreaties (BITs) andfree tradeagreements (UNCTAD 2003b: 3; see also
the informative overview table in UNCTAD 2003a: 122). Even a country
such as India, which imposed performance requirements on one in three
FDI projects intheearly 1990s, has relaxed mostperformancerequirements
other than the 100 percent export obligation for firms operating in export
processing zones (UNCTAD 2003b: 110). According to survey results pre-
sented bythe European Round Table ofIndustrialists (2000), performance
requirements have become less restrictive since the early 1990s in almost all
developing countries under consideration.





developing countries' own interest ifthey agreed to tighter discipline with
respect to performance requirements. However, there is little, ifany, em-
pirical evidence supporting the argument that developing countries could
attract more FDI in this way. The results ofseveral studies on the effects of
BITs on FDI in signatory countries can be summarized as follows: «Policy-
makers arewell advised notto puttheir faith in BITs as a major stimulus to
higherFDIinflows" (NunnenkampandPant2003: 12). Correlationanalyses
ofthese authors do not support the proposition that performance require-
ments discouraged FDI in a sample of28 developing countries. Moreover,
as noted above, developing countries would not necessarily benefit from
FDI even ifless performance requirements were to result in more FDI.
On the other hand, many proponents of performance requirements
tend to take it for granted that the «quality" ofFDI, i.e., its developmental
impact, can be enhanced by applying them. For instance, Kumar (2001:Nunnenkamp: How to Improve the Developmental Impact 527
3152) blames the TRIMs Agreement for curtailing ((the ability ofthe host
governments to improve the qualityofFDI in tunewith their development
objectives" (see also Singh 2001). Such statements ignore that the effective-
ness ofperformance requirements is highly ambiguous. Note that Kumar
(2001) draws onthewell-known study ofMoran (1998) to supporthis own
argumentthatexportperformancerequirementsprovedusefulinencourag-
ing export-orientedmanufacturingin Latin American andAsian countries.
By contrast, the finding ofMoran (1998) that local content requirements
were counterproductive, due to the implicit protection ofinefficient local
suppliers, is suppressed as it conflicts with Kumar's positive assessment.
UNCTAD (2003b) concentrates on performance requirements that are
not prohibited by the TRIMs Agreement. The review of the experiences
ofdeveloping countries reveals a multifaceted picture and defies easy gen-
eralizations of the sort just mentioned. Certain types of performance re-
quirements are found moreuseful (orless costly) thanothers. For example,
the experience with export requirements and local training requirements
appears to be better than thatwith local ownership requirements andtech-
nologytransfer requirements. Buteven for particularperformance require-
ments, the effectiveness is shown to be context-specific. For example, the
cost-benefit calculus is likely to yield different results in a country such
as India, characterized by huge local markets and considerable bargaining
power vis-a.-vis foreign investors, and in smaller developing countries.
In any case, it is extremely difficult to assess whether performance re-
quirements were instrumental in meeting their stipulated objectives. This
is for several reasons. Trade-offs may prevent definite judgments. Local
ownership requirements can enhance the diffusion oftechnology transfers
and the chances for local learning, but they are highly likely to come at
the cost ofless transfers of state-of-the-art technologies (see also Moran
2003). Moreover, most performance requirements that are still in use tend
to be ((voluntary", rather than mandatory, in the sense that they represent
a condition for the receipt ofFDI incentives such as tax concessions. Some
requirements are intended to correct for undesirable side effects ofother
governmentinterventions.Allthisrendersitimpossibletoisolatetheimpact
'ofperformance requirements on the quantityand quality ofFDI.
The evidence on export requirements presented in UNCTAD (2003b)
clearlyexemplifies this problem. Howto interpretthe finding thatmultina-
tional enterprises (MNEs) contributed overproportionately to a country's
export earnings if, as was frequently the case, import substitution policies
resulted inan anti-exportbias whichthe governmentattemptedtooffset by528 Review ofWorld Economics 2004, Vol. 140 (3)
offeringexportincentives such as tariffcuts ordrawbackschemes in combi-
nationwiththecommitmentofMNEsto meetspecified exporttargets? The
verdict depends on the counterfactual considered. Attributing the higher
export propensity ofMNEs to the link between export requirements and
FDI incentives ignores thatthefirst-best solution would have been to tackle
the roots of the anti-export bias and, thereby, improve the international
competitiveness oflocal andforeign enterprises. Buteven underconditions
ofsecond best, the effectiveness ofexport requirements is open to ques-
tion as unconditional export incentives might have induced more FDI and
higher exports ofMNEs. Moreover, export requirements applied bya large
country as a condition for local market access may divert export-oriented
FDI away from smaller host countries which are more competitive inworld
markets buthave less bargaining power.
None ofthese arguments goes unreported in the summary assessment
in UNCTAD (2003b). In the country studies, however, the complexities
are often thrown overboard and replaced bysimplistic oreven inconsistent
statements.ThestudyonChileconcludesthat"exportperformancerequire-
ments have played an important role in encouraging a greater number of
firms to export" (ibid.: 67), even though the previous impact assessment is
exclusively about export promotion through subsidies and import facilita-
tion. Likewise, itis misleadingto considertheMotorIndustryDevelopment
Programme ofthe Republic ofSouth Africa to be a successful example of
export requirements only because "some incentive schemes have export-
related criteria attached to them" (ibid.: 188) and "the motor vehicle and
automotive components sectors appear to be growing in accordance with
the objectives ofthe Programme" (ibid.: 190). In the study on India, con-
tradictoryarguments are madeto "prove" the case for exportrequirements.
The relaxation ofexport requirements in the 1990s is held responsible for
the declining share ofMNEs in India's total exports. Shortly afterwards, a
"constantly growing" export activity ofsome MNEs is perceived to show
the positive role ofearlier export requirements, "even though the export
obligation period ended" (ibid.: 93).
The finding ofthe country studies in UNCTAD (2003b) that different
FDI policies are typically pursued in combination, implying that their ef-
fects can hardly be separated from each other, provides sufficient reason
to broaden the perspective when discussing host-country efforts to foster
thedevelopmentalimpactofFDI. Furthermore,performancerequirements
have become partandparcel ofinternationalinvestment agreements (lIAs)
which are negotiated at the bilateral, plurilateral, and multilateral level.Nunnenkamp: How to Improve the Developmental Impact 529
They resemble various other contentious elements of lIAs in an import-
ant respect, namely the difficulty to strike a balance between international
investment rules, deemed necessary mainly by investors and their home
countries, andthe insistence ofhost countries onflexible and selective FDI
policies and their right to regulate MNEs.
The major strength ofUNCTAD (2003a) is to show that the national
policy space may shrink in various dimensions through the conclusion of
lIAs:
• Conflicts ofinterest emergefrom theverybeginning, i.e., when defining
investment. The trend in lIAs has been toward a broad asset-based
definition, even though most developing countries prefer a narrower
definitioninordertobeabletorestrictcapitalflows whichareconsidered
less beneficial than FDI.
• The principle ofnational treatment is widely accepted, butit may com-
promise domestic enterprise development and capacity building ifap-
plied even before foreign investors have entered a host country (pre-
establishment phase).
• As concernsnationalizationandexpropriation,so-called regulatorytak-
ings are a particularly sensitive issue: As almost all government regula-
tions have an impact on the value of private property, an extensive
interpretation ofregulatory takings may involve "the risk of'regulatory
chill', with governmentsunwillingto undertakelegitimate regulation for
fear oflawsuits from investors" (UNCTAD 2003a: Ill).
• The tendency for lIAs to include investor-to-state dispute settlement
provisions (in addition to the conventional state-to-state dispute settle-
ment provisions) may further undermine the governments' effective
ability to regulate, especially when it comes to conflicts between small
developing countries andlarge and powerful MNEs.
• Foreigninvestorsandtheirhomecountriescallfor strongerprotectionof
intellectual property rights in lIAs, although recent empirical analyses
support UNCTAD's view that this would not automatically result in
more FDI and higher transfers oftechnology. Nunnenkamp and Spatz
(2004) find that the impact ofintellectual propertyrights protection on
the quantity and quality ofFDI depends on host-countryconditions as
well as indus~ry characteristics.
UNCTAD suggests reasonable ways ofhow to ease some ofthese con-
flicts. For instance, lIAs may use a broad definition of investment with
regard to the protection ofinvestment, while provisions on the liberaliza-530 Review of World Economics 2004, Vol. 140 (3)
tion ofinvestment may be restricted to FDI. In a similar vein, the national
treatmentprinciple maybe applied onlyafter an investment has been made
(post-establishment phase).
Other suggestions are less intuitive or remain rather vague. It is ob-
viously true that a regulatory imbalance exists as lIAs increasingly limit
the use ofperformance requirements, whereas lIAs do not constrain the
international competition for FDI by means offiscal incentives and other
subsidies. However, itis hardlyconvincingto request onlydeveloped coun-
tries to stop the incentives race to the top. According to Oman (2001: 65),
"much of the competition for FDI is effectively among governments in
the same geographic region, i.e. among relative neighbours." Itfollows that
preferentialtreatmentofdevelopingcountrieswith regardto FDI incentives
wouldhardlystrengthentheirbargainingpositionwhenMNEsstartplaying
potential host countries offagainst each other to bid up the value ofincen-
tives (Nunnenkamp and Pant 2003). As concerns FDI-related technology
transfers, UNCTAD claims thatthere is a clear case for policysupportin the
host economy. Yet, it remains unclear howexactly governments can induce
MNEs ((to transfer the technologies that offer the best potential for local
development" (UNCTAD 2003a: 129).
Another imbalance criticized in UNCTAD (2003a: Chapter VI) is that
lIAs hardly deal with obligations ofthe foreign investors, nor with home-
country measures to encourage development-friendly FDI flows to host
economies. Andindeed, thepredominanceofairydeclarationsoverbinding
commitments ofMNEs and home countries is in striking contrast to in-
creasinglystringenthost-countryobligations. Considering public concerns
about outsourcing to lower-cost locations and adverse labor market impli-
cations in developed countries, however, it seems unreasonable to expect
home countriesto provide financial andfiscal incentives to outward FDI or
to effectively strengthenthe capacityofdeveloping hostcountries to absorb
technology-intensive FDI (ibid.: 155-6). Likewise, the proposed concept of
((good corporate citizenship" rests on dubious assumptions. For instance,
whatever rules ontransfer pricingmaybe agreed, the call for MNEs to ((pay
greater attention to cont~ibutingto public revenues" (ibid.: 164) is likely to
remain wishful thinking unless the host countries stop subsidizing FDI.
Taken together, the two recent UNCTAD publications invite several
conclusions onhow (not) to improve the developmental impact ofFDI:
• The large number of politically contentious issues and the empirical
ambiguity concerning at least some ofthem (notably performance re-Nunnenkamp: How to Improve the Developmental Impact 531
quirements andintellectual propertyrights protection) indicate thatthe
case for liAs is much weaker than one might suspect from the prolif-
eration of such agreements and the increasingly binding character of
host-country obligations.
• The proliferationofliAs appears to be mainlybecause ofthepressure of
developed countries for more and stricter investment rules. Developing
countries may have become aware only lately ofthe ensuing erosion of
the national policy space. Indications include: the mounting opposi-
tion against a multilateral investment agreement, which contributed to
the failure ofthe WTO Ministerial in Cancun in September 2003; the
recent request ofcountries such as Brazil and India to renegotiate the
TRIMs Agreement in orderto regain policy flexibility; as well as Brazil's
resistance against a NAFTA-style Free Trade Agreement oftheAmericas
(FTAA), including comprehensive investment provisions. At the same
time, there is no convincing evidence that liAs would result in a larger
quantity and higher quality of FDI flowing to developing countries if
only the latter adhered to stricter investment rules. Consequently, it is
reasonable to concludethatdeveloping countries ((should be free to take
the risk oflosing the investments from foreign firms for the sake ofspe-
cific development objectives they wish to promote" (UNCTAD 2003b:
39-40).
• Nevertheless, morepolicyflexibility atthenationallevel andless binding
international investment rules cannot be equated with a better devel-
opmental impact ofFDI. Especially in UNCTAD (2003a), such a bias
is shining through repeatedly. The implicit assumption that govern-
ments know best which FDI-related technology transfers are needed
most (ibid.: 129) is as questionable as the one that traditional methods
to preserve national policy space, rangingfrom ((various kinds ofexcep-
tions, reservations, derogations,andwaiverstotransitionarrangements"
(ibid.: 149), are necessarily development-friendly. Furthermore,inlight
ofthe "disenchanting" (Langhammer 1999: 21) experience with special
and differential treatment ofdeveloping countries in the area oftrade
policy, it is far from obvious that the application ofthe same principle
in liAs would enhance the developmental impactofFDI.
• Thelimitationsofflexible andselective FDI policies arenotonlybecause
ofthe costs ofgovernmentfailure. The effectiveness ofFDI policies also
depends on whether they are part ofa broader strategy to improve the
developmental impact of FDI. Critical elements include the develop-
mentoflocal complementaryfactors ofproduction (e.g., education and532 Review ofWorld Economics 2004, Vol. 140 (3)
skills, local suppliers, infrastructure and business services) as well as
the promotion ofinterfirm linkages. While UNCTAD (2003a) provides
several hints at the importance ofsuch factors, the publications under
review are not meant to elaborate a broad-based strategy. This is done
elsewhere, e.g., in UNCTAD (2001) where various policy options are
discussed to promote linkages between MNEs and local enterprises. It
should be noted thatmanymeasures suggested there relate to local cap-
acity building, rather than representing FDI policies in a narrowsense.
In summary, market failure is not a sufficient condition for flexible
and selective FDI policies to be effective. Taking into account the practical
difficulties todesignstrategicFDI policies, thebestruleofthumbfor policy-
makers maybe to refrain from pursuingsuch policies altogether (Hoekman
and Saggi 2000: 636), even though UNCTAD does not reach a similarly
strong-but, politically, fairly unattractive-conclusion. In any case, poli-
cymakers are well advised to look beyond specific FDI policies and tackle
the internal bottlenecks to FDI becoming a stronger stimulus to economic
progress in developing countries.
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